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Reforming the government is a crucial component of both the transition from a 
planned to a market economy and economic development. Creating thriving markets 
in these economies typically requires transforming a highly centralized and 
interventionist government into one that supports the market and fosters decentralized 
economic activities. In China, on the one hand, fiscal system, characterized as “fiscal 
contracting system” and “separating tax system”, gives local government fiscal 
incentives. On the other hand, the vertical control system with local officials 
appointed by the central government, by which the central government reward and 
punish local officials on the basis of their economic performance, gives local 
government political incentives. Whether fiscal or political incentives, these motivate 
local officials to promote the local economy. 
There are two different production technologies. “Good” technology is a way to 
protect environment or save resources. “Bad” technology destroys environment and 
wastes resources. Both technologies generate the same output. However, their costs 
differ. “Good” technology has extra cost. “Bad” technology creates a negative 
externality. Because the cost of economic development will not appear until a long 
period have past, the central government does not observe the real cost in a relative 
short tenure of local government. Local government connives that the capital may 
adopt the “bad” technology for the aim of economic growth in a short period. In 
addition, this article analyses the behavior of local government when corruption 
occurs. 
    The models and main conclusions of this article are the following: 
1. By using the dynamic and static models, we show that representative household 
(individual) will invest both in “good” and “bad” technology after considering 
long-term utility, and invest only in “bad” technology when considering current 
interests. 
2. By using the dynamic model, we show that the government can utilize tax and 
fiscal means to lead capital invest in “good” technology when considering the 
long-term utility of the representative household (individual). At equilibrium 
representative household (individual) will invest all in “good” technology. 
3. By studying the static equilibrium with local government, we show that under fiscal 
decentralization system, whether or not considering the negative externality brought 
from “bad” technology will decide different behavior of local government. A local 
government which does not consider the negative externality brought from “bad” 
technology will acquire higher GDP growth rate only by reducing punishment rate 














4. By studying the static equilibrium with corruption in local government, we show 
that the capital invested in corruption will be influenced by the punishment rate local 
government imposes on “bad” technology. At a relative high punishment rate, 
representative household (individual) need bribe local government to reduce the tax 
probability for maximizing output. 
The innovation of this article is to investigate how local governments make 
different decisions for different local economic growth aims under fiscal and political 
incentives of central government. 
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